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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution in fast fading channels
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We investigate the performance of several continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols
in the presence of fading channels. These are lossy channels whose transmissivity changes according
to a probability distribution. This is typical in communication scenarios where remote parties
are connected by free-space links subject to atmospheric turbulence. In this work, we assume the
worst-case scenario where an eavesdropper has full control of a fast fading process, so that she
chooses the instantaneous transmissivity of a channel, while the remote parties can only detect
the mean statistical process. In our study, we consider coherent-state protocols run in various
configurations, including the one-way switching protocol in reverse reconciliation, the measurement-
device-independent protocol in the symmetric configuration and a three-party measurement-device-
independent network. We show that, regardless of the advantage given to the eavesdropper (full
control of fading), these protocols can still achieve high rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2]
is to establish a secret key between two authenticated
parties based on the laws of quantum mechanics [3]. This
key can then be used for cryptographic tasks such as the
one-time pad [4]. In QKD, the effect of eavesdropping on
the exchanged quantum systems between the parties can
be detected and quantified so that a shared secret key can
be extracted. This is achieved by implementing the cor-
rect amount of error correction and privacy amplification
after communicating via a public channel. Significant
advantages have been provided by the use of continuous
variable (CV) systems [5], in particular, with Gaussian
states [6]. CV systems can transfer higher amounts of
information per signal with respect to qubit-based ap-
proaches and they rely on cheaper technological imple-
mentations. A number of CV-QKD protocols have been
studied [7–18] and experimentally implemented [19–25].
In this scenario, another concept that needs to be
treated carefully is that of side channel attacks, where
the eavesdropper (Eve) creates an alternate channel with
the aim of directly attacking the setups where the sig-
nal states are prepared and measured. A practical but
partial solution was proposed in 2012 and known as
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [26, 27],
later extended to the CV setting [28–30]. An MDI-QKD
protocol can be seen as a “prepare and measure” version
of entanglement swapping [31] where the middle Bell de-
tection is performed by an untrusted relay. Recently, a
suitable generalization of the Bell detection to many par-
ties has led Ref. [32] to introduce a multipartite CV-MDI-
QKD star network with an arbitrary number of users.
Today the field of CV-QKD needs to accomplish two
main complementary tasks. The first one is the invention
of practical protocols that can achieve the high secret key
rates that are ideally accessible with CV systems. When
implemented with ideal reconciliation efficiencies, low-
loss couplings and highly-efficient detectors, CV-QKD
protocols are not so far from the ultimate Pirandola-
Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound for private
communications over a lossy channel [33] (see also ex-
tensions of this bound to multiple users [34], repeaters
and networks [35], and other developments [36–38]). The
other task is improving the security analysis of CV-QKD
protocols so as to include realistic issues associated with
their practical realization, e.g., finite-size effects [39, 40],
and other aspects such as composability [41, 42].
In terms of realistic implementations, one should also
consider the possibility of temporal variations of the com-
munication line between two remote users as modeled by
the so-called fading channel. In this case, the transmis-
sivity η of the link between the two parties is not constant
and may take values according to some probability dis-
tribution [43]. This description usually emerges from the
fact that the parties use a free-space link [44] that is sus-
ceptible to the atmospheric turbulence [45–51]. Previous
studies (e.g., see Ref. [52]) have considered the symmet-
ric situation where both users and eavesdropper are sub-
ject to truly environmental fading. In this manuscript,
we consider a different situation, i.e., the worst-case sce-
nario where the eavesdropper is in complete control of
the quantum channel, so that she may choose different
instantaneous values of the transmissivity for each use of
the channel.
This type of fading is fast so that the users are only able
to estimate the statistical distribution of the transmissiv-
ity but not its instantaneous values. This is in contrast
to slow fading where the transmissivity of the channel
remains constant for sufficiently many uses allowing the
remote users to estimate its actual value. In mathemati-
cal terms, for some fixed transmissivity η consider the key
rate as given by the difference between the mutual infor-
mation IAB of the remote parties and the accessible infor-
mation IE of the eavesdropper, i.e., R(η) = IAB − IE . In
slow fading, the key rate is averaged over the distribution
of the transmissivity. In fast fading, this is not the most
conservative approach. While we may still consider the
average I˜E for the eavesdropper, we need to assume the
2FIG. 1: One-way switching protocol. Alice prepares a co-
herent state on mode A whose mean value x is modulated
according to a Gaussian with variance φ. This state is sent
through the channel with transmissivity η whose value may
be changed by Eve in each use of the channel. Bob gets an
output mode B, which is homodyned randomly in the q or p
quadratures, with outcome y. Eve’s attack also comprises of
her sending mode E of an EPR state to interact with mode
A in a beam splitter interaction with instantaneous transmis-
sivity η, and injecting thermal noise ω. After the interaction
she stores mode E′ and the other EPR mode e in a quantum
memory to be measured at the end of the quantum commu-
nication (collective attack).
lower transmissivity for the users, i.e., IηminAB [53]. There-
fore, the secret key rate will be given by
Rfast = βI
ηmin
AB − I˜E, (1)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is a reconciliation parameter.
In this work, we adopt a basic model of fading chan-
nel where the transmissivity is uniformly distributed over
some interval. Then, we study the performance of sev-
eral CV-QKD protocols in the worst-case scenario. We
first investigate the effects in the case of the one-way
coherent-state switching protocol [7] in reverse reconcili-
ation (Sec. II). In Sec. III, we then study the CV-MDI-
QKD protocol [28] in the symmetric configuration [30].
Finally, in Sec. IV, we focus on the case of a CV-MDI-
QKD network [54] considering three remote users. In all
cases we show that high key rates are achievable within
reasonable distances, even in the presence of fast-fading
attacks.
II. ONE-WAY QKD UNDER FAST FADING
Consider a sender (Alice) preparing a bosonic mode
A using coherent states whose mean values x = (xq, xp)
are chosen according to a zero-mean Gaussian distribu-
tion with variance φ. These states are sent through a
channel with transmissivity η to Bob, who then applies a
homodyne measurement to either the q or p quadrature
of his output mode B, with the outcome being described
by a random variable y (see Fig. 1). For each use of the
channel, Eve has a two-mode squeezed vacuum state [6]
with thermal variance ω ≥ 1, which represents a realistic
version of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair in CV
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FIG. 2: Fast fading channel. Secret key rates are plotted for
∆η = 0.2 (dashed blue line), ∆η = 0.5 (solid blue line) and
∆η = 0.6 (dotted blue line). We have set ω = 1 (passive
eavesdropping), β = 1 (ideal reconciliation) and µ = 106. We
compare the results with the PLOB bound for repeaterless
private communications over a lossy channel (black line) [33].
We can see that high rates can be achieved up to losses of
about 6− 7dB, where the rates start to rapidly decrease.
systems. This state describes modes e and E as depicted
in Fig. 1. Then Eve’s remote mode E is made to interact
with Alice’s mode A via a beam splitter with transmis-
sivity η which takes values from a uniform distribution
Pη with extremal values ηmin and ηmax = ηmin + ∆η.
Thus, Eve receives mode E′ and stores both e and E′
in a quantum memory, to be measured at the end of the
entire quantum communication.
An arbitrary input signal state ρ undergoes a transfor-
mation via a thermal-loss channel Eη,ω(ρ) for a specific η
randomly chosen by Eve (while ω is kept as fixed). The
asymptotic key rate will be given by Eq. (1). Here, Eve’s
information on Bob’s variable (reverse reconciliation) is
given by the averaged Holevo bound
I˜E =
∫
dηPηχ(E : y), (2)
where
χ(E : y) = S(ρE′e)− S(ρE′e|y) (3)
with S(·) being the von Neumann entropy computed over
Eve’s output state ρE′e and her conditional output state
ρE′e|y (given Bob’s outcome y).
The derivation is simplified by using the entanglement-
based (EB) representation of the protocol [6], where,
for each use of the channel, Alice holds an EPR pair
with parameter µ = φ + 1 and sends one of the modes
through the channel. By heterodyning her kept mode
a, Alice projects the other travelling mode A into a
modulated coherent state. This allows us to exploit pu-
rification arguments and write S(ρE′e) = S(ρaB) and
S(ρE′e|y) = S(ρa|y). Furthermore, because the states in-
volved are all Gaussian, we may write the von Neumann
entropy in terms of the symplectic eigenvalues of the co-
variance matrices (CMs) of ρAB and ρA|y. In fact, for a
Gaussian state whose CM has symplectic spectrum {z},
31 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Attenuation (dB)
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
R
 [b
its
/us
e]
FIG. 3: Comparison between fast and slow fading. We plot
the secret key rate for the fast fading channel (lower blue line)
and slow fading channel (upper black line) for ∆η = 0.1. We
also set µ = 106, ω = 1 (passive eavesdropping) and β = 1
(ideal reconciliation). Performances are comparable within
the range between 0 and 6 dB.
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FIG. 4: Comparison between fast and slow fading. As in
Fig. 3 but for ω = 1.01, β = 0.98, and optimized over µ.
we may write
S =
∑
z
h(z), (4)
where
h(z) =
z + 1
2
log2
z + 1
2
−
z − 1
2
log2
z − 1
2
. (5)
In Eq. (1), the term IηminAB represents the mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob, who does not know
the instantaneous value of the transmissivity but only
the uniform distribution Pη with minimum transmissiv-
ity ηmin. Therefore, they need to choose the worst-case
scenario associated with the minimum possible transmis-
sivity. As a result, their mutual information turns out to
be IηminAB := IAB(ηmin) where
IAB(η) =
1
2
log2
VB
VB|xq
. (6)
Here VB is the variance of Bob’s variable y, and VB|xq is
the conditional variance given Alice’s input xq (or xp),
computed for a generic value of the transmissivity η.
In the regime of µ≫ 1 we may compute
χ(E : y) =
1
2
log2
η(1 − η)µ
ω
+ h(ω), (7)
and
IAB(η) =
1
2
log2
ηµ
η + (1− η)ω
. (8)
Thus, the secret key rate for a fast fading channel is given
by
Rfast = βIAB(ηmin)−
1
∆η
∫ ηmax
ηmin
dηχ(E : y). (9)
In particular, if we restrict ourselves to a pure-loss chan-
nel and we set β = 1 then the rate above simplifies to
Rlossfast =
1
2∆η
[g(η¯min −∆η)− g(η¯min)]
−
1
2∆η
(ηmin +∆η) log2
ηmin +∆η
ηmin
+ log2 e, (10)
where g(x) = x log2 x and x¯ = 1 − x. Note that, for
slow fading, both Alice and Bob’s mutual information
and Eve’s Holevo information need to be averaged so that
Rslow =
1
∆η
∫ ηmax
ηmin
dη[βIAB(η)− χ(E : y)]. (11)
In Fig. 2 we show the secret key rate for a fast-fading
channel with ∆η = 0.2, ∆η = 0.5 and ∆η = 0.6, also
compared with the PLOB bound, which sets the limit
for repeaterless private communication over a lossy chan-
nel [33]. In Fig. 3 we compare the key rates for slow and
fast fading considering ∆η = 0.1. In Fig. 4, we consider
the secret key rates for ∆η = 0.1 but including extra
thermal noise ω = 1.01 and assuming a non-ideal recon-
ciliation parameter β = 0.98 (rates are optimized over
µ). As we can see from the plots, the key rate is high up
to losses of the order of 6− 7dB, even in the presence of
fast fading attacks.
III. CV-MDI-QKD UNDER FAST FADING
The detailed calculations for the CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol can be found in the Supplementary Material of
Ref. [28, 30]. Here we consider the symmetric configura-
tion, so that each link with the untrusted relay is a fading
channel whose transmissivity (ηA and ηB) follows a uni-
form probability distribution, while the thermal noise ω
is equal and fixed. For fast fading, we have
RMDIfast =βIAB(ηmin)−
−
1
(∆η)2
∫ ηmin+∆η
ηmin
∫ ηmin+∆η
ηmin
dηAdηBχ(ηA, ηB),
(12)
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FIG. 5: Performances of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol in sym-
metric configuration assuming two fading channels in the links
with ∆η = 0.1 and no excess noise (ω = 1). We plot the secret
key rate for fast fading (lower blue line), slow fading (upper
black line), and also for the standard case of a non-fading
lossy channel (middle red dashed line) over the expectation
value of η, i.e., η¯ = ηmin +
∆η
2
. We set β = 1 and µ = 106.
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FIG. 6: We plot the same cases as in Fig. 5, but assuming
a two-mode correlated attack with noise ω = 1.01, imperfect
reconciliation β = 0.98 and optimization over µ. As expected,
the key rates deteriorate.
where IAB(η) and χ(ηA, ηB) are given in Refs. [28, 30].
In Fig. 5, we present secret key rates for β = 1,
ω = 1 and very large modulation µ ≃ 106, while we set
∆η = 0.1. We see that the performance for fast fading
is not so far from that related to slow fading and that
is achievable with a standard lossy channel. In Fig. 6,
we then present the same instances but for β = 0.98,
optimizing over µ and setting ω = 1.01. In this lat-
ter case, the eavesdropper may also optimize her attack
by exploiting correlations in the injected environmental
state [28].
IV. CV-MDI-QKD THREE-USER NETWORK
UNDER FAST FADING
Let us start with investigating the protocol assuming
lossy channels. We consider a three-party network where
Alice, Bob and Charlie prepare coherent states for their
modes A, B and C. The mean values are Gaussian vari-
ables x1, x2, and x3 with the same variance φ. Then they
send these states to an untrusted relay through three
links described by lossy channels with transmissivities
ηA, ηB and ηC respectively. The relay is assumed to oper-
ate in a certain way in each channel use. In particular, as
illustrated in Fig. 7, it mixes Alice’s and Bob’s modes in
a beam splitter with transmissivity τ1 = 1/2 and homo-
dynes the q quadrature of the output mode R−1 , while the
mode R+1 is mixed with Charlie’s mode in a beam splitter
with transmissivity τ2 = 2/3. Then, the output modes
R−2 and R
+
2 are homodyned with respect to the q and
p quadrature, respectively. All the measurement results
γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3) are then broadcast (see Fig. 7). This is
the three-party realization of the multipartite CV Bell de-
tection recently introduced in Ref. [54]. The distributed
classical correlations can be processed by the three par-
ties to derive a common secret key for secure quantum
conferencing. See Ref. [54] for a CV-MDI-QKD quan-
tum conferencing network with arbitrary number of par-
ties (and Ref. [55] for a recent fully device-independent
quantum conferencing network in discrete variables).
Although the relay is assumed to be under the control
of the eavesdropper, we can always assume an attack that
is described by an attack restricted in the links according
to the discussion in Ref. [28]. More specifically, a corre-
lated attack among all the three links is described by a
covariance matrix. Here each of the modes are interact-
ing by a beam splitter with each of the modes that the
parties send through the channel. This CM is given by
VEAEBEC =

ωAI G1 G3G1 ωBI G2
G3 G2 ωCI

 , (13)
where ωA, ωB and ωC are the vectors of the noise in-
jected by the eavesdropper in each link whereas Gi =
diag(gi, g
′
i) describes the correlations between the modes.
When gi and g
′
i are equal to zero, the attack is reduced
to an uncorrelated attack, which is the case that we in-
vestigate in this study.
In terms of the security analysis, we adopt the EB rep-
resentation of the protocol, where the (traveling) modes
A, B and C are each one half of an EPR pair with pa-
rameter µ = φ + 1. Then heterodyne measurements are
applied to the ancillary EPR modes a, b, and c so that
the traveling modes are projected onto modulated coher-
ent states. In this representation, Eve’s Holevo bound
χ is given by the symplectic eigenvalues of the total CM
Vabc|γ and the conditional CMVbc|γ,x1 following the rea-
soning in Sec. II. In particular, the total CM is defined
as the CM of the parties’ local modes after the applica-
tion of the three relay measurements with outcomes γ,
and the conditional CM is derived by the total CM after
applying a heterodyne detection on mode a (we assume
that Alice’s variable is the one to reconciliate with).
The mutual information in the case of the three par-
ties is defined as the minimum of the mutual informa-
tion between Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie, i.e., Imin =
min{IAB, IAC}. Each of the terms are evaluated by the
formula IAB(C) =
1
2 log2Σb(c), where we have the follow-
5FIG. 7: Three-party CV-MDI-QKD network. The parties
prepare coherent states in the modes A, B and C whose mean
values are Gaussian variables x1, x2 and x3, with variance φ.
Then the parties send these states to the relay using links
with transmissivities ηA, ηB and ηC respectively. After trav-
eling through the links the modes arrive at the relay as modes
A′, B′ and C′ and processed by the relay. Although the relay
is under the full control of the eavesdropper, we can assume
without loss of generality that it operates consistently in each
use of the channel: (a) firstly it mixes Alice’s and Bob’s modes
in a beam splitter with transmissivity 1/2 and measures the
q-quadrature of mode R−1 with a homodyne detection, (b)
subsequently mixes Charlie’s mode with R+1 and then mea-
sures the q-quadrature and p-quadrature of modes R−2 and
R+2 respectively, (c) finally the results of the measurements
γ1, γ2 and γ3 are broadcast. As in Ref. [28], any general at-
tack affecting both the links and the relay can be reduced
to an attack tampering only with the links. In this case,
Eve is injecting thermal noise ω1, ω2 and ω3 in each of the
links by means of the modes EA, EB and EC interacting with
modes A, B, C. In a general Gaussian attack, Eve’s modes
are described by a correlated Gaussian state whose covariance
matrix is specified in Eq. (13).
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FIG. 8: The rate for the three-party star configuration pro-
tocol based on the CV-MDI-QKD scheme, optimized over µ.
ing (for m = b or c)
Σm =
det(Vm|γ) + tr(Vm|γ) + 1
det(Vm|γ,x1) + tr(Vm|γ,x1) + 1
, (14)
in terms of the covariance matrices of the local mode m.
As a result, the secret conferencing key rate is given
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FIG. 9: The secret conferencing key rate in a star config-
uration of the three-party CV-MDI-QKD network assuming
fast-fading channels (blue solid line) and slow-fading channels
(black solid line) with the same variance ∆η = 0.05. We also
include the rate of the protocol in the presence of lossy chan-
nels with transmissivity η¯ = η+ ∆η
2
. For all the plots we have
optimized over µ ∈ [2, 20] and set ω = 1.
by
R(µ,ω,η) = βImin(µ,ω,η)− χ(µ,ω,η), (15)
where ω = (ωA, ωB, ωC) is the vector of the noise in-
jected by the eavesdropper in each link with correspond-
ing transmissivity η = (ηA, ηB, ηC). Numerically, we
have checked that, even for ideal reconciliation β = 1,
the largest value of µ is not the optimal and we have
therefore to optimize the rate over µ. In the case of a
star configuration, the previous rate simplifies to
Rstar(µ, ω, η) = βImin(µ, ω, η)− χ(µ, ω, η), (16)
where ηA = ηB = ηC := η and ωA = ωB = ωC := ω. This
is plotted in Fig. 8 for passive eavesdropping (ω = 1).
Consider the star configuration in the presence of fad-
ing channels affecting the links, with uniform distribu-
tion between ηmin and ηmin +∆η. We need to integrate
the Holevo bound with respect to the three transmissivi-
ties of the channels and compute the mutual information
assuming the minimum transmissivity (worst-case sce-
nario). Thus, we write
Rstarfast = βImin(µ, ω, ηmin)−
∫∫∫ ηmin+∆η
ηmin
χ(µ, ω,η)
(∆η)3
dη,
(17)
The rate for ∆η = 0.05 and ω = 1 is optimized over µ
and shown in Fig. 9. From the figure, we can see that
the performance is comparable to the case of slow-fading
where the parties’ mutual information is averaged over
the statistical distribution.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we have investigated the effects of fading
channels in the links used by authorized parties in various
quantum key distribution protocols. More specifically,
6we have studied the one-way switching protocol with
coherent states in reverse reconciliation, the symmet-
ric configuration of continuous-variable measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution protocol,
and its extension to a three-user network for quantum
conferencing. Fading describes channels with randomly
varying transmissivity according to a probability dis-
tribution that encompasses effects present in free-space
communications where the links are under the influence
of atmospheric turbulence. Here, we have considered the
most random scenario where the distribution is uniform
between two extremal values.
In particular, our work considers the worst-case sce-
nario where the eavesdropper is assumed to have the full
control of the fading channel. In other words, it is Eve
who fixes the instantaneous value of the transmissivity,
not just the environment. When this value is changed
very fast, e.g., for each transmission, then we have a fast
fading attack which makes the honest user in a partic-
ularly disadvantage situation. They can only access the
probability distribution of fading at the end of the quan-
tum communication and they therefore need to assume
the minimum transmissivity (compatible with that dis-
tribution) for the extraction of their secret key.
As we discussed in our paper, this is clearly differ-
ent from a slow fading attack where the action of the
eavesdropper is slow with respect to the quantum com-
munication so that the transmissivity is approximately
constant over a large block size. This allows the honest
user to make an estimate of the transmissivity to be used
in the extraction of part of the key. In any case, our work
shows that the performance achievable in the worst-case
scenario in the presence of fast fading is not so far from
the performance under slow fading. In particular, suffi-
ciently high rates can be achieved within ranges of dis-
tance which are typical of the various protocols analyzed.
Such results prove the robustness of continuous-variable
quantum key distribution protocols under conditions of
turbulence which may be typical in realistic free-space
scenarios.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
C.W. would like to acknowledge the Office of Naval
Research programCommunications and Networking with
Quantum Operationally-Secure Technology for Maritime
Deployment (CONQUEST), awarded to Raytheon BBN
Technologies under prime contract number N00014-16-
C-2069. The content of this paper does not necessarily
reflect the position or policy of the Government and no
official endorsement should be inferred. P. P. acknowl-
edges support from the EPSRC via the ‘UK Quantum
Communications Hub’ (EP/M013472/1).
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[2] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M.
Dusek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, Rev. Mod. Phys.
81, 1301 (2008).
[3] M. A. Nielsen, and I. L. Chuang, Quantum computation
and quantum information (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2000).
[4] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography (John Wiley & Sons,
New York, 1996).
[5] S. L. Braunstein and P. van Loock, Rev. Mod. Phys. 77,
513 (2005).
[6] C. Weedbrook, S. Pirandola, R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, N. J.
Cerf, T. C. Ralph, J. H. Shapiro, and S. Lloyd, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 84, 621 (2012).
[7] F. Grosshans and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88,
057902 (2002).
[8] C. Weedbrook, A. M. Lance, W. P. Bowen, T. Symul, T.
C. Ralph, and P. K. Lam, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 170504
(2004).
[9] C. Ottaviani, S. Mancini, and S. Pirandola, Phys. Rev.
A 95, 052310 (2017).
[10] R. Filip, Phys. Rev. A 77, 022310 (2008).
[11] C. Weedbrook, S. Pirandola, and T. C. Ralph, Phys. Rev.
Lett 105, 110501 (2010).
[12] V. C. Usenko and R. Filip, Phys. Rev. A 81, 022318
(2010).
[13] C. Weedbrook, S. Pirandola, and T. C. Ralph, Phys. Rev.
A 86, 022318 (2012).
[14] C. Weedbrook, C. Ottaviani, and S. Pirandola, Phys.
Rev. A 86, 012309 (2014).
[15] V. Usenko and R. Filip, Entropy 18, (2016)
[16] S. Pirandola, S. Mancini, S. Lloyd, and S. L. Braunstein,
Nat. Phys. 4, 726 (2008).
[17] C. Ottaviani and S. Pirandola, Sci. Rep. 6, 22225 (2016).
[18] V. Usenko and F. Grosshans, Phys. Rev. A 92, 062337
(2015).
[19] T. Gehring, C. S. Jacobsen, and U. L. Andersen, Quan-
tum Information and Computation, 16, 1081 (2016).
[20] L. S. Madsen, V. C. Usenko, M. Lassen, R. Filip, and U.
L. Andersen, Nat. Commun. 3, 1083 (2012).
[21] F. Grosshans, G. Van Ache, J. Wenger, R. Brouri, N. J.
Cerf, and P. Grangier, Nature 421, 238 (2003).
[22] P. Jouguet, S. Kunz-Jacques, A. Leverrier, P. Grangier,
and E. Diamanti, Nat. Photon. 7, 378 (2013)
[23] J. Lodewyck, M. Bloch, R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, S. Fossier, E.
Karpov, E. Diamanti, T. Debuisschert, N. J. Cerf, R.
Tualle-Brouri, S. W. McLaughlin et al., Phys. Rev. A 76
(4), 042305 (2007).
[24] C. S. Jacobsen, T. Gehring, and U. L. Andersen, Entropy
17, 4654 (2015).
[25] Y.-C. Zhang et al., Continuous-variable QKD over 50km
commercial fiber, arXiv:1709.04618 (2017)
[26] S. L. Braunstein and S. Pirandola, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108,
130502 (2012).
[27] M.Curty, B. Qi, H.K. Lo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503
(2012).
[28] S. Pirandola, C. Ottaviani, G. Spedalieri, C. Weedbrook,
7S. L. Braunstein, S. Lloyd, T. Ghering, C. S. Jacobsen,
and U. L. Andersen, Nat. Photon. 9, 397 (2015).
[29] S. Pirandola, C. Ottaviani, G. Spedalieri, C. Weedbrook,
S. L. Braunstein, S. Lloyd, T. Ghering, C.S. Jacobsen,
and U. L. Andersen, Nat. Photon. 9, 773 (2015).
[30] C. Ottaviani, G. Spedalieri, S. L. Braunstein, and S. Pi-
randola, Phys. Rev. A 91, 022320 (2015).
[31] S. Pirandola, C. Weedbrook, J. Eisert, A. Furusawa, and
S. L. Braunstein, Nat. Photon. 9, 641–652 (2015).
[32] C. Ottaviani, C. Lupo, R. Laurenza, and S. Pirandola,
arXiv:1709.06988.
[33] S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, and L.
Banchi, Nat. Commun. 8, 15043 (2017). See also
arXiv:1510.08863 and arXiv:1512.04945 (2015).
[34] R. Laurenza, and S. Pirandola, Phys. Rev. A 96, 032318
(2017).
[35] S. Pirandola, Capacities of repeater-assisted quantum
communications, arXiv:1601.00966 (2016).
[36] T. P. W. Cope, L. Hetzel, L. Banchi, and S. Pirandola,
Phys. Rev. A 96, 022323 (2017).
[37] R. Laurenza, S. L. Braunstein, and S. Pirandola, Finite-
resource teleportation stretching for continuous-variable
systems, arXiv:1706.06065 (2017).
[38] S. Pirandola, and C. Lupo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 100502
(2017).
[39] L. Ruppert, V. C. Usenko, and R. Filip, Phys. Rev. A
90, 062310 (2014).
[40] P. Papanastasiou, C. Ottaviani, and S. Pirandola, Finite
size analysis of measurement device independent quantum
cryptography with continuous variables, arXiv:1707.04599
(2017).
[41] A. Leverrier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 200501 (2017).
[42] C. Lupo, C. Ottaviani, P. Papanastasiou, and S. Piran-
dola, CV MDI QKD: Composable Security against Co-
herent Attacks, arXiv:1704.07924 (2017).
[43] V. C. Usenko, B. Heim, C. Peuntinger, C Wittmann, C.
Marquardt, G. Leuchs, and R. Filip, New J. Phys. 14,
093048 (2012).
[44] L. C. Andrews and R. L. Phillips, Laser Beam Propa-
gation Through Random Media (SPIE, Bellingham, WA,
2005) 2nd ed. Vol. PM152.
[45] C. Peuntinger, B. Heim, C. R. Mueller, C. Gabriel, C.
Marquardt, and G. Leuchs, Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 060502
(2014).
[46] B. Heim, C. Peuntinger, N. Killoran, I. Khan, C.
Wittmann, C. Marquardt, and G. Leuchs, New J. Phys.
16, 113018 (2014).
[47] N. Hosseinidehaj and R. Malaney, Phys. Rev. A 91,
022304 (2015).
[48] D. Vasylyev, A. A. Semenov, and W. Vogel, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 117, 090501 (2016).
[49] M. Bohmann, A. A. Semenov, J. Sperling, and W. Vogel,
Phys. Rev. A 117, 010302(R) (2016).
[50] N. Hosseinidehaj and R. Malaney, Phys. Rev. A 94,
010302 (2015).
[51] M. Bohmann, J. Sperling, A. A. Semenov, and W. Vogel,
Phys. Rev. A 95, 012324 (2017).
[52] N. Hosseinidehaj and R.Malaney, CV-MDI Quantum
Key Distribution via Satellite, arXiv:1605.05445 (2016).
[53] The approach is similar to what happens in a finite-size
security analysis [39, 40], where the step of parameter es-
timation provides a statistical distribution for the values
of the channel parameters. From this statistical distribu-
tion, the parties choose worst-case values for the param-
eters, e.g., a minimum value of the transmissivity that is
compatible with the observed distribution. In the same
fashion, in the presence of a fast fading channel, there is
a probability distribution associated with the transmis-
sivity and the most conservative strategy for Alice and
Bob is to choose the worst-case value. In particular, for
a uniform distribution, this means to pick the minimum
value in the interval of possible transmissivities.
[54] C. Ottaviani, C. Lupo, R. Laurenza, and S. Piran-
dola, High-rate quantum conferencing and secret sharing,
arXiv:1709.06988 (2017).
[55] J. Ribeiro, G. Murta, and S. Wehner, Fully device in-
dependent Conference Key Agreement, arXiv:1708.00798
(2017).
